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and this becomes obvious also when looking at the strategic 
plans of Romanian universities. However, as often stated in 
closed national debates, the rationales for this consensus 
are mostly linked with the opportunity to attract more non-
EU, fee-paying students.
A Need For Policy Coherence 
Romania can be seen as a laboratory for how various inter-
national processes, norms, and institutions have changed 
the higher education landscape in 25 years of democratic 
transition. Despite its openness to international develop-
ments, the public debate and ownership over substantive 
reforms remain illusory, and that is partially due to the dou-
ble discourse used by decision-makers in order to avoid in-
ternational stigma or lose votes internally. Without a sound 
public debate on current challenges and their solutions, 
drawing on existing good practice and taking into account 
international commitments, Romania’s higher education 
sector will remain vulnerable, instead of bringing a solu-
tion for sustainable socioeconomic development. 
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Russia is about to become an academic superpower, which makes it very successful at least in the context 
of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China. After 
various effective reforms, including the Bologna process 
and the modernization of admissions procedures, the Rus-
sian government is now working hard on remedying cor-
ruption in higher education. Why is corruption in this sec-
tor so prevalent? In this article, we argue that the improper 
dependencies of all the involved actors make corruption 
possible. Improper dependencies are mutually dependent 
relationships that lead to unhealthy or unconstructive out-
comes. Young people without an academic degree have few 
chances on the job market in Russia. The faculty is under 
pressure from the university administration, to retain the 
current cohort of students at all costs. The administration 
is under budgetary pressure from the Ministry of Education 
and Science at public universities and from the students 
themselves at private universities.
Demographic Crisis and “Unteachable” Students
Many Russian universities are currently facing difficult 
times. The continuing decline in the birth rate, taking place 
since the 1990s, has inevitably resulted in a decrease in the 
numbers of university applicants. The number of universi-
ties, however, remain high, despite the obvious demograph-
ic crisis. In the 2014–2015 academic year, there were 950 
universities in Russia, including 548 state and 402 private 
schools and, in addition, more than 1,600 regional branch-
es. Only the most prestigious universities—about 30 to 40 
institutions throughout the country that receive generous 
support from the Ministry of Education and Science—are 
in a position to be selective with their admissions.
The remaining mass higher education institutions are 
left to compete for students, who are often not qualified to 
carry on with university-level studies, not invested in receiv-
ing a high-quality education, and looking instead to get by 
until they finish their diploma—however, nominal their 
actual learning may be. The total number of students in 
Russia is very high. Each year, almost 80 percent of all sec-
ondary school graduates go to a university, and almost all 
of them graduate—a number that has remained constant 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The Institutional Trap
These mismatched trends produce a power imbalance, 
where universities need their students more than the stu-
dents need the universities. Public universities receive their 
budget allocation according to the number of students. If 
they expel students, they need to return the money they 
received from the state for those students. This is hardly 
possible, because the money is already covering personnel 
and other costs. It might also mean that, in the next aca-
demic year, the budget will be cut by the state and the uni-
versities will need to dismiss faculty or staff, or close some 
programs. Private universities are completely dependent on 
their students’ fees. With some exceptions, those universi-
ties would not be able to exist without their students. This 
is further complicated by the fact that, formally, universities 
are the gatekeepers of the official credentials, endorsed by 
the government, and are responsible for raising quality of 
higher education. The conflicting goals of the empowered 
students and the disempowered universities create a fur-
ther problem of clashing interests. This is where improper 
dependencies are essentially formed. Universities, as a re-
sult, are squeezed between a rock (students’ preferences) 
and a hard place, to appear legitimate and meet governmen-
tal requirements, which effectively places their day-to-day 
operations in an institutional trap.
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Institutional Adaptation and Corruption
Survival and self-preservation can be powerful motivating 
factors. Institutions can be easily propelled by these forces 
to create methods to adapt to their difficulties. Faced with 
this challenge, which threatens their own organizational 
survival and personal financial stability, university faculty 
members have no choice than to lower their standards in-
formally, while projecting outward quality in order to satisfy 
their assessors. The lowering of standards creates a breed-
ing ground for cynicism, professional disappointment, and 
resentment toward students as well as the government, 
which is unable to regulate the situation effectively.
Once the standards are lowered and cynicism is allowed 
to flourish, a fertile ground has been created for academic 
corruption. If it is no longer possible to derive professional 
satisfaction from intellectual engagement with the students, 
then the fact that the students can be used as a source of ad-
ditional income provides a certain amount of consolation. 
Each individual faculty member has a choice to take part or 
not to take part in this culture. Those who do not participate 
will be coerced to abide by the silent agreement, to lower 
their standards. Those wishing to remain active participants 
have the opportunity to supplement their income—average 
Russian academic salaries are quite low—and recalibrate 
the institutional power imbalance in their favor, albeit only 
at a personal level. The majority, thus, forms an academic 
conspiracy, which is a very powerful structure that sustains 
the existence of the individual faculty members in both fi-
nancial and psychological terms—and naturally punishes 
those who do not participate willingly.
Who is Guilty and What Can Be Done?
Students, or at least some of them, are guilty of lacking 
the proper motivation when entering higher education. It 
might be unfair to expect this from very young or some-
times even underage people in a society in which blue-col-
lar workers have lost their former prestige, and the system 
of vocational education is almost destroyed. Disappointed, 
disillusioned, and overloaded academics have a choice with 
regard to their individual involvement in obvious monetary 
corruption or covert nonmonetary corruption, including ac-
ademic collusion—by ignoring the lack of academic integ-
rity among their students. They may even not be fully aware 
of how inappropriate their actions are. As most academics 
in a given university are also graduates from the same in-
stitution, they simply end up repeating the familiar pat-
terns they have learned, while being students themselves. 
The government, while striving to boost the international 
legitimacy of the higher education system, is disregarding 
the natural demographic trends and the quality of the sec-
ondary school graduates. Equally, however, each individual 
actor, including the government, is a victim of the overall 
institutional trap and the burgeoning corruption grounded 
in its distorted links and relationships. The victim status 
perpetuates the sense of helplessness, and the belief that 
the “citadel” is more powerful than its members.
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California has been at the leading edge of modernity since World War II. New social trends, tendencies, and 
tensions tend to show up in California before they spread 
to everywhere else. For example, in an extraordinary 14-
year period, California invented university student power 
(Berkeley 1964), hippies and the collectivist counter-culture 
(San Francisco 1967)—followed by the high individualist 
tax revolt, in the form of Proposition 13, which was passed 
by a state referendum in 1978 and capped local govern-
ment taxes and spending. All of these movements went 
on to sweep across the whole world, and, in some respects 
that are still with us. The 1980s and 1990s phenomena of 
Silicon Valley and Steve Jobs—also still with us, is not to 
mention the continuous influence of California’s film and 
television industry.
In the past 60 years, California has also led the world 
in policy and provision of higher education and university-
based science, while at the same time leading the evolution 
of ideas about university education. California is unmatched 
in its concentration of high-quality public campuses (for 
example, University of California, Berkeley; University of 
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These mismatched trends produce a 
power imbalance, where universities 
need their students more than the stu-
dents need the universities.
